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Abstract. This study directly compares quantity inferences from scalar implica-
tures (‘Some of the ducks are black’) and uniqueness presuppositions in definites
(‘the duck is black’) to exhaustivity inferences in English it-clefts (‘It’s the duck
that’s black’) for which the theoretical literature disagrees on the source of infer-
ence – pragmatic (like scalar implicatures), or semantic (like presuppositions). We
investigate whether within-subjects correlations in acquisition can inform us about
the source of exhaustivity inferences. Assuming comprehension is achieved once
the necessary basis for meaning is acquired, it-clefts should pattern with presuppo-
sition judgments if computing a presupposition is involved and should pattern with
scalar implicature judgments if computing an implicature is involved. We conduct
three experiments to test how closely it-cleft judgments pattern with other quantity-
related inferences, keeping materials maximally similar. The first two experiments
test adult participants using a Truth Value Judgment Task and then a 3-point Rat-
ing Task; we find that adults’ response patterns to under-informative uses of these
constructions differ both across individuals and across inference types, with the
Rating Task giving more informative results. In the third experiment, we use the
3-point Rating Task with 4-, 5-, and 6- year olds to characterize response pat-
terns across the three inference types for each individual subject. We find that the
individual response patterns children exhibit are consistent with the theory that
it-cleft exhaustivity shares an underlying cognitive source with the computation of
presupposition inferences, but not with scalar implicature inferences.
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1. Introduction. As part of normal language development, children must master the diverse
landscape of inferences that people make in discourse. English sentences with it-clefts, such
as in (1), carry one such relevant inference, called an ‘exhaustivity inference’. That is, the sen-
tence in (1) gives the interpretation that there is nothing other than the duck that is black, mak-
ing ‘the duck’ an exhaustive listing of salient black things.
(1) It’s the duck that’s black.
Explanations for the source of exhaustivity inferences in it-cleft structures vary, and there is a
lack of consensus on where this inference is derived from. Relevant theoretical works tend to
fall into one of two camps, placing the source for exhaustivity inferences in the same group
as either presuppositions or implicatures. We broadly refer to these two options as ‘semantic’
and ‘pragmatic’ approaches to it-cleft exhaustivity1. Our goal is to characterize the mechanism
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underlying this exhaustivity inference by directly contrasting it with inferences derived from
scalar implicatures and uniqueness presuppositions.
Past studies on the acquisition of exhaustivity inferences have revealed mixed results. Cre-
mers et al. (2016) tested how 5-year-olds understand the ambiguity of weakly exhaustive infer-
ences in questions (those embedded under “know”). They found that although children at this
age understand the exhaustive interpretation, they gave responses that reflect a strongly exhaus-
tive reading. They concluded that, at least for children, exhaustivity in questions is derived in
a way that is potentially related to scalar implicature judgments for children, and not necessar-
ily through the adult-like application of an exhaustification operator (the same type of operator
theorized to be at play for it-cleft exhaustivity, among other inferences).
In a study that directly investigated children’s understanding of it-clefts, Tieu & Krizˇ (2017)
found that children consistently accepted non-exhaustive interpretations2, indicating that they
may fail to generate or integrate the relevant exhaustivity inference. The children in their study
also accepted sentences with presupposition failures of plural definites, though, while adults
consistently rejected these items. They concluded that their results are in line with semantic
accounts of exhaustivity, specifically relating the inference to children’s understanding of ho-
mogeneity requirements. Given the inconclusive findings in the few studies that look at the
acquisition of exhaustivity, we directly test whether one instance of exhaustivity inferences,
English it-clefts, patterns more closely with presuppositions or implicatures in children.
1.1. IT-CLEFT EXHAUSTIVITY AS SEMANTIC. Büring & Križ (2013) attribute the exhaustivity infer-
ence in it-clefts to semantic content and argue that it is a presupposition of it-clefts. In (2), the 
exhaustivity trigger is embedded under a belief context. On a semantic account, because the 
exhaustive interpretation associated with ‘only’ is at-issue, the speaker can felicitously deny 
having known something about that exhaustivity, but the same is not the case for the not-at-issue 
exhaustivity in (2-b).
(2) a. I knew that the duck was black, but I didn’t know that only the duck was black.
b. # I knew that the duck was black, but I didn’t know it was the duck that’s black.
Krizˇ (2016) offers a somewhat updated version of this approach, framing the it-clefts as “iden-
tity statements between two individuals.” On this analysis, they also expect it-clefts and defi-
nite descriptions to pattern together. While we do not directly test this inference here, this pos-
sibility has been addressed by Aravind et al. (2018).
Similarly, Velleman et al. (2012) consider exhaustivity as part of the not-at-issue content
in it-clefts. On their view, it-clefts contrast with only-constructions as ‘only’ presupposes a
minimal answer and asserts a maximal one, while it-clefts presuppose a maximal answer and
assert a minimal one. Though there are slightly different predictions made by these theories,
we take a broad approach here, namely, if the underlying cognitive or linguistic mechanism is
related to presupposition-based inferences, we expect it-clefts or definite descriptions to pattern
together with other presuppositions in a measurable way.
Destruel et al. (2015) provide experimental evidence for a system that is at least compat-
ible with that of Velleman et al. (2012). Focusing on the question of what semantic content is
at-issue versus not-at-issue, they found that the most acceptable answer to a violation of the
2 However, it’s notable that in their study adults also accepted non-exhaustive readings in it-clefts about half the time, 
though still at rates lower than children.
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exhaustivity inference in it-clefts is to respond with “yes, but...” (or “yes, and...”) over just a
straight response of “yes” or “no”, and claim that the at-issue content is accepted when one
responds “yes”, but that the exhaustivity, which is not-at-issue, still needs to be addressed.
Building off of the idea that it-cleft exhaustivity is literally a type of presupposition, we
take as a comparison a sentence of the form in (3), where the form is maximally similar to
the it-cleft type sentence shown in (1) and the meaning of the inference is similarly related a
quantity-based restriction. The relevant presupposition of (3) is that there is a single salient
duck, and it is black. Thus any context in which there are two black ducks would be incongru-
ent with this presupposition.
(3) The duck is black.
Past studies that have investigated judgments of presupposition violations have found that even
adults are not as consistent in their judgments as one might expect. Cremers et al. (2017) used
probability judgment tasks and found that adult participants sometimes treat sentences with a
presupposition failure as true. Similarly, on a picture-choice variant of the covered-box task,
Bill (2015) found that adults accommodate presupposition violations far more readily than
children and suggested that this difference between children’s and adults’ acceptance of sen-
tences with presupposition violations is due to accommodation being an extra step in judging
the truth of a sentence, and that children in the 4 to 7 age range are not consistently able to
compute this extra step in order to accommodate the violation. Importantly, children do not
fail to show adult-like judgments in presuppositions due to a lack of ability to reason about the
common ground. Aravind (2018) showed that even four-year-olds can use linguistic cues to
reason about an informed vs. uninformed observer. The crucial issue for presuppositions, then,
is whether children are able to understand presuppositional content as informative. Aravind
(2018) suggests that this is what may be difficult, at least for 4-year-olds.
1.2. IT-CLEFT EXHAUSTIVITY AS PRAGMATIC. Contrary to proposals that account for it-cleft 
exhaustivity with a semantic source, other researchers have proposed that it is a kind of 
pragmatic implicature, and thus it is computed in addition to the semantic content of the ut-
terance. The implicature view is driven by the observation that actual inferences derived from 
it-cleft exhaustivity are often weaker than what would be predicted based on a purely seman-
tic, presupposition-based account. Destruel (2013), for example, found cases where the exhaus-
tivity inference in French c’est-clefts (which carry the same exhaustive interpretation as the 
English cleft structures (Destruel & Donaldson 2017)) is cancellable, and thus incompatible 
with its status as a presupposition. The alternative proposal put forth is that the exhaustivity 
inference in it-clefts, unlike exclusive items like “only”, derives from an implicature, where the 
inference arises from Gricean reasoning (Grice 1975).
To test the degree to which it-clefts and “only” diverge, DeVeaugh-Geiss et al. (2015) con-
ducted two experiments using acceptability judgment ratings. They tested sentences that con-
tradict the at-issue or not-at-issue content of clefts compared to exclusives (such as “only”),
and of exclusives compared to pseudo-clefts. The results overall showed that a contradiction
of not-at-issue content in it-clefts gets a higher acceptability rating than a contradiction of the
not-at-issue content of exclusives, supporting a distinction between these two ostensibly similar
inferences. In their conclusion, they explicitly state that they consider the exhaustivity infer-
ence in it-clefts to be a kind of scalar implicature, and thus attribute it to a purely pragmatic
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source. DeVeaugh-Geiss et al. (2017) offer an updated account of these findings, though their
results are again somewhat inconclusive. They found that neither it-clefts nor definite pseu-
doclefts consistently elicited purely exhaustive interpretations, which is surprising given the
regularity of assuming exhaustive interpretations for these constructions in the theoretical lit-
erature. Rather, interpretations of what should have been infelicitous uses were also reported
to be acceptable some of the time. DeVeaugh-Geiss et al. (2017) concluded that there must be
both presuppositions and scalar implicatures at play in it-clefts and pseudoclefts.
Building off of the most standardly used sentence frame for generating this kind of scalar
implicature, we use sentences of the form in (4), which is again kept maximally similar to the
it-cleft example in (1) in both form and meaning. (4) gives rise to a scalar implicature, such
that it is only felicitous when some, but not all, of the ducks are black.
(4) Some of the ducks are black.
Many studies have focused on children’s acquisition of scalar implicature judgments using this
contrast. Though using “some” when “all” is more informative is logically true, it is underin-
formative and adults tend to reject these sentences while children accept them at greater rates
(Smith 1980; Noveck 2001; i.a.). There is some consensus that children struggle on this task
because they either do not know the lexical scale-mate to “some” (Barner et al. 2011), or they
fail to access the alternatives in real time (Skordos & Papafragou 2016). “Awareness of the
task” also affects whether children behave in an adult-like way, though this may be orthogo-
nal to their understanding of the implicature (Papafragou & Musolino 2003). Both providing
the child with examples of the relevant alternatives (Chierchia et al. 2001) and providing sub-
stantial contextual support (Foppolo et al. 2012) makes children’s judgments more adult-like,
though. Crucially, part of the issue from task effects may be due to the use of a truth value
judgment task, as this task not only artificially restricts judgments, but also collapses cases that
are actually false with those that are just infelicitous. Katsos & Bishop (2011) have shown that
using a 3-point scale can be more informative when dealing with judgments that are not actu-
ally false, but somewhere in the middle of the scale.
1.3. THE PRESENT STUDY. We test the two different accounts of it-cleft exhaustivity detailed in 
this section. In order to do this, we keep items maximally similar in form. One clear concern with 
the comparisons being made in this study is that it-clefts in English differ from the presupposition 
and scalar implicature examples that we use in that they are always bi-clausal, and therefore have 
a more complicated syntax. On the surface, this difference may predict that development of adult-
like inferences in it-clefts would require additional processing costs, and therefore cause that 
development to be delayed relative to similarly difficult mono-clausal structures. While this 
confound is unavoidable given the contrasts we’re testing, 3-year-old children already begun 
productively producing sentences with embedded CP structures, and they show competency in 
understanding the relationship between verbs and their complements by age four (Diessel & 
Tomasello 2001; de Villiers & Roeper 2016). Given these findings, the bi-clausal structure in 
clefts is not itself a barrier to children’s ability to comprehend them.
2. Experiments 1 & 2: Adult norming. We conduct two preliminary experiments to assess
the concern about task choice and to characterize the adult responses on our experimental
items. We do not yet know the within-subjects patterning of SCALAR IMPLICATURE, CLEFT,
and PRESUPPOSITION judgments in adults, so these first two experiments develop that base-
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Sentence
Condition
Sentence Congruency Image TVJT
Exp. Resp
Rating Task
Exp. Resp
Numeral
baseline
‘There are two black
ducks’
Congruent – 3
Incongruent – 1
Scalar
‘Some of the ducks are
black’
Congruent True 3
Incongruent False 2
Presup-
position
‘The duck is black’
Congruent True 3
Incongruent False 2
It-cleft ‘It’s the duck that’s black’
Congruent True 3
Incongruent False 2
Table 1. All conditions used in Experiments 1 and 2. The only difference between the experi-
ments was the response options: ‘true’/‘false’ in Experiment 1 and 1/2/3 in Experiment 2. Exper-
iment 1 did not include a numeral baseline condition.
line. The primary goal, however, is to compare two different tasks that have been used in simi-
lar acquisition studies: (i) a truth value judgment task (TVJT), and (ii) a 3-point rating task.
2.1. PARTICIPANTS. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. To ensure high 
quality data, we only recruited individuals who had completed more than 1000 HITs with an 
acceptance rate of greater than 98%, currently resided in the U.S., self-reported being native 
speakers of English, and passed two attention check items within the HIT. Experiment 1 has 
data from 50 participants, and Experiment 2 has data from 48 participants.
2.2. MATERIALS. Experimental stimuli consisted of sentences using 15 different possible con-
crete nouns in Experiment 1, and 22 nouns (15 experimental + 7 baseline) in Experiment 2. 
The full list of 15 experimental nouns was chosen with the ultimate goal of presenting these 
stimuli to children as young as 4;0, so they were selected from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test Dunn & Dunn (2007). We chose only items that, according to this test, at least 90% of 
typically-developing four-year-olds would know, with the additional constraint that the words 
were concrete nouns that could also be easily depicted as solid-colored silhouette pictures. All 
images were taken from the free clip-art options on Microsoft Powerpoint.
Each noun was used in sentences that trigger (i) a scalar implicature, (ii) a presupposition
of uniqueness, or (iii) an exhaustivity inference from an it-cleft. All sentences were presented
with an image that is either CONGRUENT (i.e., ‘True’ or ‘3’) or INCONGRUENT (i.e., ‘False’
or ‘2’). Thus every noun had six possible conditions in which it could appear. The full exper-
imental paradigm is shown for the noun duck in Table 1. Stimuli were separated into six lists,
so that the same noun never appeared in the same list twice.
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Figure 1. Results of experiments 1 and 2 showing the different pattern of responses depending on 
task type for the same stimuli. Each dot represents the mean response on a single item.
In the case of the SCALAR implicature condition, the INCONGRUENT sentence is infelic-
itous because all is more informative in this context. In the PRESUPPOSITION condition, the
INCONGRUENT statement is infelicitous because there is more than one salient duck, so the
presupposition of uniqueness from the definite determiner is violated. And in the CLEFT con-
dition, the INCONGRUENT statement is infelicitous because there is another black thing in the
image, making it non-exhaustive.
2.3. PROCEDURE. Participants began the experiment with instructions that told them to ‘judge 
whether what the sentence says is TRUE or FALSE about the picture’ (Experiment 1, TVJT) 
or to judge ‘how well the sentence goes with the picture, with 3 being good and 1 being not 
good’ (Experiment 2, Rating Task) In the TVJT, they saw one example of a true numeral base-
line item; in the Rating Task, they see two examples: one of an incongruent numeral base-
line item and one of a congruent numeral baseline item. All items were displayed on the same 
page. Participants had the option to change their initial answer, and there were no restrictions 
on the order in which participants answer the questions. In Experiment 1, we included two 
attention check items based on explicit numerals; any participant that missed one or both of 
these checks was excluded from analysis (n = 3 excluded, n = 50 included). In Experiment 2, 
we used the numeral baseline condition as inclusion criteria: any participant that did not get 
at least 6 out of the 7 items correct (where CONGRUENT = 3 and INCONGRUENT = 1) was 
excluded from analysis (n = 7 excluded, n = 48 included). The task took about two minutes 
to complete. Analysis was done in R (R Core Team 2019); we used the tidyverse suite 
Wickham (2017) for data manipulation, the ez package (Lawrence 2016) for analyses using an 
ANOVA, ggplot2 (Wickham 2016) for data visualization.
2.4.  RESULTS. Overall, we find that adults strongly distinguish between CONGRUENT and 
INCONGRUENT examples in all three experimental conditions (Figure 1). However, there are 
some striking differences in responses between the two experimental tasks.
In Experiment 1 (TVJT), participants chose ‘True’ at the expected rates (near or at 100%
in all conditions). However, only in the PRESUPPOSITION condition did participants consis-
tently select ‘False’ for the INCONGRUENT items. About a third of the time, participants re-
spond with ‘True’ in the IT-CLEFT and SCALAR cases that were intended to be False. Despite
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these differences between the conditions, independent samples t-tests shows that the differences
between True and False items is highly significant in all conditions, all ps < 0.01.
In Experiment 2 (Rating task), independent samples t-tests shows that the differences be-
tween Congruent and Incongruent items is highly significant in all conditions, all ps ¡0.01.
There are also significant differences between conditions. We analyze these differences be-
tween conditions using ANOVAs with participants (F1) and items (F2) as random effects.
Looking at the differences in INCONGRUENT items, the INCONGRUENT PRESUPPOSITION
items are rated lower than INCONGRUENT IT-CLEFT [F1(1,47) = 17.88, p < 0.01; F2(1,14) =
12.39, p < 0.01] and SCALAR [F1(1,47) = 7.62, p < 0.01; F2(1,14) = 3.92, p = 0.068] items,
but there is no significant difference between the INCONGRUENT IT-CLEFT and SCALAR items
[F1(1,47) = 1.27, p = 0.265; F2(1,14) = 2.46, p = 0.139].
2.5. DISCUSSION. When only given two possible options in Experiment 1 (TVJT), are somewhat 
inconsistent in their responses, with acceptance rates of the infelicitous CLEFT and SCALAR items 
at 25% and 34%, respectively. These results are especially surprising given that there
the stimuli contain only one item (one of the attention-check items) that is actually fully false. 
That is, the fact that the task is to determine True/False judgments, and that nearly all the re-
motely ‘bad’ examples are the ones that we expect adults to respond ‘False’ to, we have actu-
ally biased our data towards finding a stronger distinction between the True/False items than 
may actually be present. Though we might expect the difference to be exacerbated given this 
design, the pattern of responses that adults are showing reflects a much weaker distinction. By 
framing the question as a decision between ‘True’ and ‘False’, people may have responded in
a more strictly logical way than they would have otherwise. In that sense, having determined 
that the INCONGRUENT items aren’t actually false (which they are not), just weird, then choos-
ing ‘True’ is a reasonable choice for an adult.
The results from Experiment 2 (rating task) confirm that participants make the expected
CONGRUENT/INCONGRUENT distinction, and that this distinction is different from the True/False
distinction they made for the numeral baseline items. Participants consistently rated the IN-
CONGRUENT items around a 2, showing that they make at least a 3-way distinction of congru-
ent/incongruent/false. This distinction is not directly measurable in the design of Experiment 1,
which gave only two options.
We have determined through these two experiments that, for our stimuli and primary ques-
tion, the rating task used in Experiment 2 provides a more reliable measure of adult behavior
compared to the TVJT used in Experiment 1. Though TVJT is a more common task in acqui-
sition studies, we choose not to use it moving forward because the acceptability rating task is
better suited to our design.
3. Experiment 3: Child rating task. We address the question of it-cleft exhaustivity devel-
opment as a matter of change over time by looking at different age groups of children. If we
see that either the SCALAR or PRESUPPOSITION responses are patterning with the CLEFT re-
sponses, then we take this as evidence for the development of a single mechanism that may be
responsible for both inference types. We test children aged 4-6, a window of time when devel-
opment of these inferences is both active and measurable (based on prior work).
3.1. PARTICIPANTS. Forty-three children completed this study: 15 4-year-olds (11 female), 20 
5-year-olds (11 female), and 8 6-year-olds (2 female). An additional seven children began the 
study, but did not complete it. Eleven adult controls (6 female) completed the exact same task
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Figure 2. Example of a trial from Experiment 3 (child rating task). In this trial, Og says ‘Some of 
the dogs are green,’ an example of a congruent scalar implicature.
as the children.
3.2. MATERIALS. Stimuli and list creation were identical to the Experiment 2 rating task, but 
the sentence for each trial is presented as audio instead of text. Stimuli were recorded by a 
male speaker with a Mainstream American English accent. All practice trials had explicit nu-
merals that make the item either True (and thus Congruent) or False.
3.3 PROCEDURE. The task design is based on the acceptability rating task used by Katsos
& Bishop (2011). In our version of this task, children began the study by being introduced
to Og3, the caveman. The experimenter explained that Og’s favorite food is strawberries, and
that he is trying to learn to describe pictures. The child’s task was to reward Og based on how
good of a job he does describing the pictures that he sees. Children were told that if Og does
a good job, he should get three strawberries, but if he says something that’s silly, he should
only get one. This explanation was followed by practice with either two or four training tri-
als. If the child got the first two trials of training correct, they move on to the main experi-
ment. If the child got one or both of the training trials incorrect, the experimenter provided
another example of how to complete the task, again explaining the goal of rewarding Og when
he does a good job. The child then saw two more such practice trials. All but two children
passed the practice portion of the experiment, and those two that did not pass are not included
in the analysis, though they were allowed to play the game with Og.
To help keep children’s interest, we also gave them three small plastic strawberries that
they could use to ‘feed’ Og by hand. Most of the children chose to place the selected num-
ber of strawberries in a small bowl, though some of the children preferred to say a number
aloud. For the main part of the experiment, children were seated in front of a computer screen
on which Og and the pictures were displayed (see example of a screen in Figure 2) via Psy-
choPy (Peirce 2007). Each trial began with an image of Og next to a scene of three items he
needed to describe. To get the child’s attention, the experimenter would direct their gaze to the
screen, sometimes by asking a question about the items displayed and other times by saying
something like ‘let’s see what Og says this time.’ When the child was ready, the experimenter
played a short audio clip of the stimulus sentence. The child had the option to ask to hear it
as many times as they wanted, though most only needed to hear the sentence one time. Once
the child indicated the number of strawberries to reward Og with, the experimenter entered that
number on the keyboard, and the child saw Og receive 1, 2, or 3 strawberries.
On several of the trials (at least one from each of the 8 conditions, including baselines),
3 Image of Og was purchased from Vectorstock.com
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Age Condition CONGRUENT INCONGRUENT Difference
4
NUM. CONTROL 2.77 (0.41) 1.17 (0.27) 1.60
CLEFT 2.48 (0.62) 2.53 (0.65) -0.05
PRESUPPOSITION 2.76 (0.51) 2.18 (0.82) 0.58
SCALAR 2.61 (0.61) 2.41 (0.63) 0.20
5
NUM. CONTROL 2.86 (0.29) 1.12 (0.15) 1.74
CLEFT 2.84 (0.38) 2.55 (0.71) 0.30
PRESUPPOSITION 2.79 ( 0.33) 2.15 (0.85) 0.64
SCALAR 2.61 (0.67) 2.17 (0.80) 0.44
6
NUM. CONTROL 2.71 (0.49) 1.29 (0.32) 1.43
CLEFT 2.60 (0.61) 1.93 (0.67) 0.67
PRESUPPOSITION 2.81 (0.38) 1.69 (0.57) 1.12
SCALAR 2.60 (0.56) 2.33 (0.75) 0.26
Adult
NUM. CONTROL 3.00 (0.00) 1.15 (0.22) 1.85
CLEFT 2.82 (0.41) 1.83 (0.69) 0.99
PRESUPPOSITION 2.95 (0.15) 1.58 (0.61) 1.38
SCALAR 2.86 (0.23) 1.92 (0.70) 0.94
Table 2. Mean response scores for Experiment 3. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ‘Differ-
ence’ is computed as CONGRUENT minus INCONGRUENT.
the child was asked a follow-up question to get an idea of their reasoning. This prompt was
phrased as ‘Can you tell me why you’re giving Og X strawberries?’ or just ‘Let’s tell Og
why.’ Answers were recorded by hand by the experimenter/assistant or, if the child’s parents
agreed, audio from the experiment was recorded throughout. Halfway through the experiment,
Og took a break to dance, at which point the experimenter checked in with the child to see if
they wanted to continue with more trials; all children agreed to continue playing the game.
3.4 RESULTS. Before looking at the results of the experimental conditions, we exclude sev-
eral subjects based on their responses to the control items, as an inability to distinguish true
vs. false sentences via the reward system of the game makes the responses on the experimen-
tal trials impossible to interpret. We operationalize a passing score on the control trials as be-
ing any participant who both rated the CONGRUENT (i.e., True) control items on average as
greater than or equal to 2 and rated the INCONGRUENT (i.e., False) control items on average
as less than 2. We exclude, before analysis, a total of 7 children (4 4-year-olds, 2 5-year-olds,
and 1 6-year-old). All of the remaining participants distinguish the CONGRUENT and INCON-
GRUENT trials by at least 0.66 points, on average, though most distinguish them by well over
1.0 point. The mean ratings given in each age group for each condition are shown in Table 2.
Four- and five-year-old participants tend to over-accept the INCONGRUENT experimen-
tal items, even though they can accurately assign a low rating to clearly false items (numeral
baseline). The 6-year-olds in this study have very adult-like interpretations of the PRESUP-
POSITION and IT-CLEFT items, though overall they tended to over-accept the INCONGRUENT
SCALAR items at rates comparable to the four- and five-year-olds. The aggregate results for
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Figure 3. Responses to the CONGRUENT and INCONGRUENT items in each of the three ex-
perimental conditions across age groups. Within circles, * means significant or approaching 
significant difference between CONGRUENT & INCONGRUENT items. With liaison between the 
circles, * means a sig. difference on INCONGRUENT responses between age groups.
each age group are show in Figure 3. While PRESUPPOSITION judgments and, for the most
part, IT-CLEFT judgments get smoothly more adult-like over time, the trajectory for SCALAR
items is more delayed. Note that the number of subjects in the 6-year-old age group is rather
small (n=7), though, so this trend may be due to noise.
Though the general trend is that children develop judgments that look more adult-like
as they get older, this way of looking at the data does not fully address this study’s primary
question: do children individually show it-clefts patterning together closely with either of the
other two conditions? To get a sense of the individual trajectories, we conduct an exploratory
follow-up analysis of the individual patterns of response by each participant to determine if
there was a predominant pattern that emerged from what may be very heterogeneous data.
In order to break up the results into the predominant pattern, we identify a cut-off score
for categorization. Within each of the three experimental conditions, if the participant has a
mean difference of greater than 0.5 for the CONGRUENT - INCONGRUENT trials, we the par-
ticipant as having an adult-like inference. This gives eight logical possibilities for patterns that
could emerge. If the three relevant inferences develop fully independently (or rely on indepen-
dent cognitive mechanisms) and are equally ‘difficult’, then we would expect that, for children
with at least one of the inferences, response patterns will fall approximately equally across the
seven remaining response patterns. The actual number of individuals whose responses fall into
each of these patterns is shown in Table 3.
In order to assess the relationship between an individual participant’s responses on the dif-
ferent conditions, we analyze the difference score of CONGRUENT minus INCONGRUENT for
each participant (where a score of 2 is the maximum difference between CONGRUENT and IN-
CONGRUENT conditions, and 0 is no difference). This measure reflects the relative difference
in acceptability that the participant assigns to sentences in each of the three experimental sen-
tence conditions. We then compute the correlation between the three possible pairings of these
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Number of participants aged
Category 4-yrs 5-yrs 6-yrs Adult Total
All Inferences 1 2 1 5 9
No Inferences 4 6 1 0 11
Only Cleft Inferences 1 1 0 0 2
Only Presupposition Inferences 2 1 1 1 5
Only Scalar Inferences 2 4 0 0 6
Presup & Cleft Inferences 0 2 2 2 6
Scalar & Cleft Inferences 0 0 1 1 2
Scalar & Presup Inferences 1 2 1 2 6
Total Ns 11 18 7 11 47
Table 3. Distribution of each of the eight possible patterns for participant responses, broken down 
by the number of participants in each age group who fall into each category. The highlighted 
rows show the two patterns that participants fall into at rates lower than is expected by chance.
Age CLEFT-SCALAR PRESUP-SCALAR CLEFT-PRESUP
4 -0.067 (p = 0.853) -0.116 (p = 0.750) 0.145 (p = 0.690)
5 -0.509 (p = 0.031) 0.139 (p = 0.582) 0.319 (p = 0.198)
6 0.036 (p = 0.939) -0.639 (p = 0.122) 0.426 (p = 0.341)
Adult 0.485 (p = 0.130) 0.552 (p = 0.078) 0.469 (p = 0.146)
Table 4. Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r, and its p-value for each correlation.
conditions (CLEFT-SCALAR, PRESUPPOSITION-SCALAR, and CLEFT-PRESUPPOSITION) using
these mean difference scores. The correlation coefficients and their corresponding significance
levels are in Table 4, and these same values are visualized as best-fit lines in Figure 4.
None of the correlations in Figure 4 are significant above 0.05, though there are some
clear general trends. In all cases, Adults show a medium-strength positive correlation between
their responses on the two sentence conditions being compared; i.e., adults that more strongly
reject one inference also more strongly reject the other two inferences. Notably, 4-year-olds
show virtually no correlation in their responses on any of the comparisons, reflecting the fact
that they are still developing all of the relevant inferences. The only comparison where partici-
pant responses have a consistent trend in becoming more strongly correlated across age groups
is in the CLEFT-PRESUPPOSITION correlation. In the other two comparisons, correlations ei-
ther remain weak or flip between a positive/negative trend for the child participants.
3.5. DISCUSSION. The overall pattern of responses is generally compatible with two possible 
interpretations: (i) presuppositions and it-cleft exhaustivity inferences share a common, indirect 
linguistic or other cognitive source, or (ii) it-cleft exhaustivity inferences are a completely 
separate phenomenon than implicature and presupposition judgments (as proposed by Križ 
(2015)). The patterns observed are inconsistent with an account of it-cleft exhaustivity that 
derives the inference from the same underlying mechanism as implicature judgments, as we 
observe these inferences patterning together less often than chance, and the two inferences
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Figure 4. Correlations of mean difference scores between experimental conditions for each age 
group. Each dot represents a single participant.
are never even moderately positively correlated with each other during acquisition.
The aggregate results here function as a kind of sanity-check. We can clearly see that in-
ferences become more adult-like over time, and this trend can be seen as essentially a replica-
tion of the main trends noted in several other acquisition studies. Four-year-olds, overall, over-
accept many infelicitous utterances, while five year olds are beginning to make distinctions that
looks adult-like. The crucial finding here, though, deals with the individual-level analysis.
4. General discussion. We investigated whether individual response patterns in children’s re-
sponses to quantity-related inferences supported an analysis where it-cleft exhaustivity is more
similar to either semantic presupposition judgments or more pragmatic implicature calcula-
tions. We found that children’s responses to infelicitous uses of an it-cleft was positively cor-
related with their responses to presupposition violations, but not underinformative scalar impli-
catures. In development, children do not develop a more adult-like interpretation of English it-
clefts alongside scalar items, making it unlikely that these two inferences share a common cog-
nitive or linguistic mechanism. Children do, however, show a weak correlation between their
development of adult-like judgments of non-exhaustive it-clefts and violations of a presupposi-
tion of uniqueness from singular definites, indicating that there may be a shared mechanism or
reasoning used in both inferences.
Given that we do not find a evidence for a common source between it-cleft judgments and
scalar implicature judgments, one may wonder if testing a different type of implicature would
yield a different result. The choice to compare it-cleft exhaustivity to scalar implicatures, in
particular, was driven by the existing proposals in the theoretical literature that tied these infer-
ences together. However, the standard difference between scalar and non-scalar implicatures is
that the scalar items have a lexical scale-mate. In the case of English it-clefts, though, there is
no such scale-mate, and it’s not even clear which ‘scale’ the exhaustivity exists on. With these
issues in mind, it’s reasonable to wonder whether exhaustivity inferences in clefts could still
be related to implicatures, but rather to non-scalar implicatures. While we consider this pos-
sibility reasonable, we find it unlikely to have a considerable effect on the results, as the de-
velopmental trajectory for non-scalar implicatures may not be separate from that of the scalar
cases. Katsos (2009) directly compared these two implicatures and found that on a quantitative
measure, both children and adults responded to scalar and non-scalar kinds of implicatures in
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consistent ways. though children’s and adults’ responses differed from each other.
A similar concern could be raised about the choice of presupposition trigger for this ex-
periment. The full landscape of presupposition inferences and triggers is far too wide to make
a sweeping conclusion about the relationship between ‘presuppositions’ and exhaustivity in-
ferences from this study alone. In this study, we chose to keep the form of the stimuli max-
imally similar, while restricting the meaning to the more broad domain of ‘quantity-related’
inferences. However, one could also choose to keep meaning maximally similar and allow the
structure to vary more, in which case a definite description such as ‘the black thing is a duck’
would have been a reasonable comparison. In keeping meaning maximally similar, it would be
possible to test for the influence of extraneous factors such as information structure, as the or-
der of the adjective and noun in ‘the black thing is a duck’ is the opposite of our it-cleft con-
dition, ‘it’s the duck that’s black,’ though the meanings are identical.
Another potential issue that could arise from the choice of presupposition trigger in this
experiment deals with covert domain restriction. Although we attempted to control the domain
by presenting a simple scene of only three items, it is possible, for both the child and adult
participants, that when they over-accepted the incongruent stimuli (particularly in the presup-
position condition), they were able to “fix” the incongruity by adding an even smaller domain
restriction within which the sentence would be congruent. While participants’ use of this strat-
egy could have added a certain amount of noise to the study, we note that the presupposition
condition was likely the easiest for participants, in the sense that children developed towards
adult-like judgments earlier compared to the other conditions and adults rated incongruent pre-
supposition violations lower than they rated the other incongruent conditions.
Finally, we return to the possibility that a third type of inference, homogeneity, underlies
the exhaustivity inference in it-clefts. The relationship between homogeneity and the French
counterpart to it-clefts was studied by Tieu & Krizˇ (2017) using a TVJT with children aged 3
to 6. Their crucial contrast used plural definites (e.g., ‘The ducks are black’, which gives the
inference that the ducks are homogeneous with respect to being colored black – i.e., they’re all
black) and it-cleft structures in congruent and incongruent set-ups, very similar to our Exper-
iment 3. While the results were potentially consistent with children’s development of it-cleft
exhaustivity relying on the same underlying inference as the plural definites, these two condi-
tions did not clearly follow the same trajectory. However, the analysis used in this study looks
at the data in the aggregate, so a direct comparison with the results of our individual analysis
is not possible.
More recently in an extended version of this study, Tieu et al. (2019) use an individual-
level analysis similar to our Table 3 to assess the possibility of a single cognitive/linguistic
mechanism underlying both homogeneity inferences and implicature judgments. They find ev-
idence supporting a distinction between the two inferences, at least in terms of their develop-
ment, as they identified a group of children who had acquired homogeneity inferences while
not yet having acquired adult-like judgments on scalar implicatures. Taking their findings to-
gether with our own, it is necessary to further investigate a homogeneity account of it-cleft
exhaustivity, as this possibility is still consistent with the experimental findings discussed here.
Though we leave this for future study, we note that a direct comparison of both singular and
plural definites to it-cleft inferences is a clear next step in this line of research.
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5. Conclusion. Through a within-subjects comparison of maximally-similar quantity-related
inferences, we were able to assess the degree to which these inferences pattern together in
their acquisition trajectory. We find evidence in support of an account where exhaustivity is
not literally ‘built-on’ any other inferences, but rather may share a common source with pre-
suppositions. The individual response patterns that we observe among 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds
offers a snapshot of the ways that this development can take place.
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